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#### The role of the ballot is to answer the resolutional question- The aff’s failure to advance a topical defense of federal policy undermines debate’s potential

#### Our interpretation is grammatically correct

Ericson 3 Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or policy into action **though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### This is prior question to debate

Shively 00 Ruth Lessl, Former Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. – Texas A&M, in “Political Theory and Partisan Politics”, Ed. Portis, Gundersen and Shively, pp. 181-182

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to-they must reject and limit-some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest-that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect-if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

#### Voting issue for limits and ground- there are an infinite number of reasons that the scholarship of their advocacy could be a reason to vote aff, these obviate the only predictable strategies based on topical action- they overstretch our research burden and undermine preparedness for all debates.

#### Competitive debate is a dialogue between two teams- fairness is key to meaningful participation for both sides

Galloway 7 professor of communication at Samford University, Ryan, “DINNER AND CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 (2007), ebsco

Debate as a dialogue sets an argumentative table, where all parties receive a relatively fair opportunity to voice their position. Anything that fails to allow participants to have their position articulated denies one side of the argumentative table a fair hearing. The affirmative side is set by the topic and fairness requirements. While affirmative teams have recently resisted affirming the topic, in fact, the topic selection process is rigorous, taking the relative ground of each topic as its central point of departure. Setting the affirmative reciprocally sets the negative. The negative crafts approaches to the topic consistent with affirmative demands. The negative crafts disadvantages, counter-plans, and critical arguments premised on the arguments that the topic allows for the affirmative team. According to fairness norms, each side sits at a relatively balanced argumentative table. When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However, it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant (Ehninger, 1970, p. 110). A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice. Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage, fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced. Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197). Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). For example, an affirmative case on the 2007-2008 college topic might defend neither state nor international action in the Middle East, and yet claim to be germane to the topic in some way. The case essentially denies the arguments that state action is oppressive or that actions in the international arena are philosophically or pragmatically suspect. Instead of allowing for the dialogue to be modified by the interchange of the affirmative case and the negative response, the affirmative subverts any meaningful role to the negative team, preventing them from offering effective “counter-word” and undermining the value of a meaningful exchange of speech acts. Germaneness and other substitutes for topical action do not accrue the dialogical benefits of topical advocacy.

#### A limited topic of discussion is key to decision-making and advocacy skills- targets the discussion

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.¶ Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.¶ To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'\* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.¶ Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Discussion of policy-questions is crucial for skills development- posits students as agents of decision-making

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These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6 The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis\*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts\*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7¶ By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to ‘‘grapple with the issues arising from a world in flux.’’11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political and technical facts\* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and merely receiving knowledge, students actively research ‘‘their’’ government’s positions and actively argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to contextualize and act on information.14

#### Switch-side debate encourages critical thinking and advocacy skills

Harrigan 8 Casey, Associate Director of Debate at UGA, Master’s in Communications – Wake Forest U., “A Defense of Switch Side Debate”, Master’s thesis at Wake Forest, Department of Communication, May, pp.6-9

Additionally, there are social benefits to the practice of requiring students to debate both sides of controversial issues. Dating back to the Greek rhetorical tradition, great value has been placed on the benefit of testing each argument relative to all others in the marketplace of ideas. Like those who argue on behalf of the efficiency-maximizing benefits of free market competition, it is believed that arguments are most rigorously tested (and conceivably refined and improved) when compared to all available alternatives. Even for beliefs that have seemingly been ingrained in consensus opinion or in cases where the public at-large is unlikely to accept a particular position, it has been argued that they should remain open for public discussion and deliberation (Mill, 1975). Along these lines, the greatest benefit of switching sides, which goes to the heart of contemporary debate, is its inducement of critical thinking. Defined as "reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do" (Ennis, 1987, p.10), critical thinking learned through debate teaches students not just how advocate and argue, but how to decide as well. Each and every student, whether in debate or (more likely) at some later point in life, will be placed in the position of the decision-maker. Faced with competing options whose costs and benefits are initially unclear, critical thinking is necessary to assess all the possible outcomes of each choice, compare their relative merits, and arrive at some final decision about which is preferable. In some instances, such as choosing whether to eat Chinese or Indian food for dinner, the importance of making the correct decision is minor. For many other decisions, however, the implications of choosing an imprudent course of action are potentially grave. As Robert Crawford notes, there are "issues of unsurpassed important in the daily lives of millions upon millions of people...being decided to a considerable extent by the power of public speaking" (2003). Although the days of the Cold War are over, and the risk that "The next Pearl Harbor could be 'compounded by hydrogen" (Ehninger and Brockriede, 1978, p.3) is greatly reduced, the manipulation of public support before the invasion of Iraq in 2003 points to the continuing necessity of training a well-informed and critically-aware public (Zarefsky, 2007). In the absence of debate-trained critical thinking, ignorant but ambitious politicians and persuasive but nefarious leaders would be much more likely to draw the country, and possibly the world, into conflicts with incalculable losses in terms of human well-being. Given the myriad threats of global proportions that will require incisive solutions, including global warming, the spread of pandemic diseases, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cultivating a robust and effective society of critical decision-makers is essential. As Louis Rene Beres writes, "with such learning, we Americans could prepare...not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet" (2003). Thus, it is not surprising that critical thinking has been called "the highest educational goal of the activity" (Parcher, 1998). While arguing from conviction can foster limited critical thinking skills, the element of switching sides is necessary to sharpen debate's critical edge and ensure that decisions are made in a reasoned manner instead of being driven by ideology. Debaters trained in SSD are more likely to evaluate both sides of an argument before arriving at a conclusion and are less likely to dismiss potential arguments based on his or her prior beliefs (Muir 1993). In addition, debating both sides teaches "conceptual flexibility," where decision-makers are more likely to reflect upon the beliefs that are held before coming to a final opinion (Muir, 1993, p,290). Exposed to many arguments on each side of an issue, debaters learn that public policy is characterized by extraordinary complexity that requires careful consideration before action. Finally, these arguments are confirmed by preponderance of empirical research demonstrating a link between competitive SSD and critical thinking (Allen, Berkowitz, Hunt and Louden, 1999; Colbert, 2002, p.82).

#### Effective deliberation is the lynchpin of solving all existential global problems

Lundberg 10 Christian O. Lundberg Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, “Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century By Allan D. Louden, p311

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly infonnation-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them.¶ The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-). Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:¶ To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . . students in the Instnictional [debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)¶ Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.¶ There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills, oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life.¶ Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy [in an] increasingly complex world.

## 1NC

#### Critical pedagogy effectively displaces anti-capitalist struggle with post-modern politics of inclusion—affirming the multiplicity of struggles undermines historical-material analysis.

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[Peter, “Critical Pedagogy and Class Struggle in the Age of Neoliberal Globalization: Notes from History’s Underside[1]” The International Journal of INCLUSIVE DEMOCRACY, Vol. 2, No. 1 <http://www.inclusivedemocracy.org/journal/-vol2/vol2_no1_mcclaren_PRINTABLE.htm> accessed date: 4-29-12 y2k]

Authoritative as the term may sound, ‘critical pedagogy’ has been extraordinarily misunderstood and misrepresented. Once considered by the faint-hearted guardians of the American dream as a term of opprobrium for its powerful challenge to the bedrock assumptions characterizing the so-called US ‘meritocracy’, critical pedagogy has become so completely psychologized, so liberally humanized, so technologized,  and so conceptually postmodernized, that its current relationship to broader liberation struggles seems severely attenuated if not fatally terminated.  While its urgency was once unignorable, and  its hard-bitten message had the pressure of absolute fiat behind it, critical pedagogy seemingly has collapsed into an ethical licentiousness and a complacent relativism that has displaced the struggle against capitalist exploitation with a postmodern emphasis on the multiplicity of interpersonal forms of oppression. The conceptual net known as critical pedagogy has been cast so wide and at times so cavalierly that it has come to be associated with anything dragged up out of the troubled and infested swampland of educational practice, from, for instance,  classroom furniture organized in a "dialogue friendly" circle to "feel-good" curricula designed to increase students' self-image.  It's multicultural education equivalent can be linked to a politics of diversity that includes ‘respecting difference’ through the celebration of  ‘ethnic’ holidays and themes such as  ‘black history month’ and  ‘Cinco de Mayo’. I am scarcely the first to observe that critical pedagogy has been badly undercut by practitioners who would mischaracterize its fundamental project. In fact, if the term ‘critical pedagogy’ is refracted onto the stage of current educational debates, we have to judge it as having been largely domesticated in a manner that many of its early exponents, such as Brazil's Paulo Freire, so strongly feared.   In the United States, critical pedagogy has collapsed into left liberal attempts by progressive educators to remediate the educational enterprise.  This has resulted in a long list of reform initiatives that include creating  ‘communities of learners’ in classrooms; bridging the gap between student culture and the culture of the school; engaging in cross-cultural understandings; integrating  multicultural content and teaching across the curriculum; developing techniques for reducing racial prejudice and conflict resolution strategies; challenging Eurocentric teaching and learning as well as the ‘ideological formations’ of European immigration history by which many white teachers judge African-American, Latino/a, and Asian students;  challenging the meritocratic foundation of public policy that purportedly is politically neutral and racially colour-blind; creating teacher-generated narratives as a way of analysing teaching from a ‘transformative’ perspective; improving academic achievement in culturally diverse schools; affirming and utilising  multiple perspectives and ways of teaching and learning;  and de-reifying the curriculum and exposing ‘metanarratives of exclusion’. Most of these pedagogical initiatives are acting upon the recommendations of the National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future – a commission bent upon challenging social class and ethnicity as primary determinants of student success.  And for all their sincere attempts to create a social justice agenda by attacking asymmetries of power and privilege and dominant power arrangements in U.S. society, progressive teachers have, unwittingly, operated under the assumption that these changes can be accomplished within the existing social universe of capital.  Critical pedagogy has been taken out of the business of class analysis and has focussed instead on a postmodernist concern with a politics of difference and inclusion —a position that effectively substitutes truth for singular, subjective judgement and silences historical materialism as the unfolding of class struggle In capturing the ‘commanding heights’ of left educational criticism, postmodernist educators have focussed their analysis on the subject as consumer in contrast to the Marxian emphasis of the subject as producer and in doing so have emphasized the importance of a textual subversion of fixed identity, and a decentering of subjectivity. Too often this work collapses politics into poetics. Marxist educationalists maintain that neoliberal ideology as it applies to schooling is often given ballast by poststructuralist-postmodernist/deconstructive approaches to educational reform because many of these approaches refuse to challenge the rule of capital and the social relations of production at the basis of the capitalist state.

#### Use of discursive analysis is part of the culture turn – despite their attempts to incorporate materialism it remains culturalist and stuck within the paradigm of capitalism.

Ebert and Zavarzadeh 8 Teresa L., English, State University of New York, Albany, Mas’ud, prolific writer and expert on class ideology, “Class in Culture”, p. 27-29

On the theoretical level, the attacks on labor focused on the material logic: the question that Sumner H. Slichter had raised, namely that the U.S. was "shifting from a capitalistic community to a laboristic one-that is to a community in which employees rather than businessmen are the strongest single influence." This second cultural front developed new arguments for the legitimacy, permanence, and transhistorical moral and social authority of capitalism as an economic regime that was seen as the condition of possibility for human freedom. This is what, for example, F. A. Hayek's writings did. Not only did they provide the grounds for a Neoliberal economics that marginalized Keynesianism, but they also offered an ethics and a philosophy for capitalism (The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism). In a subsequent move, post-theory("post" as in postcolonialism, postrnarxism, poststructuralism, etc.) translated Neoliberal economies into a new philosophy of representation that made discourse the primary ground of social reality. Discourse was not simply a "text" in its narrow sense but the ensemble of the phenomena in and through which social production of meaning takes place, an ensemble that constitutes a society as such. The discursive isnot. therefore, being conceivedas a level nor even as a dimension of the social, but rather as being co-extensive with the social.. .. There is nothing specifically social which is constituted outside the discursive, it is clear that the non-discursive is not opposed to the discursive as if it were a matter of "'1'0 separate levels. History and society are an infinite text. (Laclau, "Populist Rupture and Discourse" 87) Class in post-theory was turned into a trope whose meanings are wayward and indeterminate-a metaphor for a particular language game(Jenks, Culture 4). This move has de-materialized class by hollowing out its economic content and turning its materialism into "a materiality without materialism and even perhaps without matter" (Derrida, "Typewriter Ribbon" 281). This de-materializing has taken place through a network of "post" interpretive strategies: Such as "destruction" (Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology 22- 23); "deconstruction" (Derrida, "Letter to a Japanese Friend"); "schizoanalysis"(Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia 273-382); "reparative reading"(Sedgwick, Touching Feeling 123-151), "cultural logic"(Jameson, Postmodernism or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism); "performativity"(Butler, Gender Trouble); **"**immaterial labor"(Hardt and Negri, MultItude), and "whatever(qualunque)" (Agamben, The Coming Community). The goal of both the populist and the theoretical campaigns against the labor movement-which capital often referred to as "socialistic schemes" (Fones- Wolf 52}---has been the blurring of class lines by depicting class antagonisms as cultural differences**,** and to persuade people that, as Wallace F. Bennett, chairman of the National Association of Manufacturers put it, **"**We are all capitalists"(quoted in Fones-Wolf 70-73). In other words, as far as capitalism is concerned, there are no class differences in the U.S. and what makes people different are their values, lifestyles, and preferences. We call this obscuring of class relations by cultural values and the play of language the "cultural turn."The term "cultural turn" is often used to designate a 'particular movement in social and cultural inquiries that acquires analytical authority in the 1970s and is exemplified by such books as Hayden White's Metahistory and Clifford Geertz's The Interpretation of Cultures , both of which were published in 1973. White describes history writing as a poetic act and approaches it as essentially a linguistic (tropological) practice (Metahistory ix). The view of history and social practices as poiesis-which is most powerfully articulated in Heidegger's writings and is re-written in various idioms by diverse authors from Cleanth Brooks through Jacques Derrida to Giorgio Agamben-constitutes the interpretive logic of the cultural turn. Geertz's argument that culture is a semiotic practice, an ensemble of texts (Interpretation of Cultures 3- 30), canonizes the idea of culture as writing in the analytical imaginary. **The** cultural tum is associated by some critics with the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s**,** whose cultural activism they assume energized rebellion against "scientific" social and cultural inquiries and ushered in the cultural tum with its linguistic reading of culture and emphasis on the subjective (Bonnell and Hunt, ed., Beyond the Cultural Turn 1-32). Other critics have also related the cultural tum to the radical activism of the post-1968 era and to postmodemism as well as to a tendency among radical intellectuals,as Larry Ray and Andrew Sayer put it, to approach language no longer as reflecting "material being" but to read it(in Heidegger's words) as the "house of being"(Culture and Economy after the Cultural Turn I). These andsimilar explanations of the cultural tum are insightful in their own terms. However, **"**their own terms" are not only historically narrow but are conceived within the very terms that they seem to critique: they are, in other words, accounts of the cultural tum from within the cultural tum. As a result, in spite of their professed interest in material analysis, their interpretations, like the writings of the cultural tum, remain culturalist. Theytoo analyze culture in cultural terms-that is, immanently. Culture cannot be grasped in its own terms because its own terms are always the terms of ideology. Therefore to understand culture, one needs to look "outside."

#### Identity politics causes fracturing- only addresses symptoms not the cause

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What kind of politics can this philosophical framework generate for its adherents The withdrawal of its major proponents from political commitment is well known, but this in itself is hardly a cutting criticism. Many postmodernists bid for the mantle of radical politics on the grounds that all universalist ideologies that have emerged from Europe are inescapably bound up in the dominant discourses of capitalism and imperialism. This includes Marxism, social democracy, many forms of feminism and even antiracisms. Instead, political action must mean resistance. Resistance is most effective at the margins, whether through the use of irony or deconstruction in art, literature, film or media or in localised struggles of some social movements that confront marginalisation. Terry Eagleton characterises this as "cultural politics" in which culture is reduced to politics. In turn, he calls for a politics of culture.22 While this is a forceful argument, it is also the case that politics, as it is recast in cultural politics, also falls prey to reductionism. The post-structuralist focus on culture reduces politics to aesthetics and presumes that this is the major battleground. The fully fledged version of this argument is Baudrillard's, which aestheticises a social world in which meaning is simulated so often that reality is no longer relevant. In this vision of culture, any capacity for more generalised critique is annulled, and the obvious conclusion must be that critique and praxis are futile. If there is any power in this prescription at all, then the very least that can be said in response is that this unacceptably narrows the range of critical politics. Identity politics flows logically from this broader censure of universalism. It is derived from the postmodern condition of fragmentation and decentring, according to postmodernists. At the level of description, this basic argument does have some force. Capitalism drives towards totalisation (as some postmodernists might put it) in its pursuit of unlimited capital growth, markets and resources. It unifies different societies and spheres of human endeavour by subsuming them under capital's rule. Yet, it is quite clear that the major fluctuations of late capitalism-unemployment, the roller-coaster ride of global markets-are experienced by their victims as fragmenting and decentring. The destabilising effects of capitalism result from its central contradictions, and yet these contradictions impact on everyday lives in ways that seem incoherent. This appearance is most visible in the OECD countries where, not by coincidence, postmodernism has flourished. It is in the most developed zones of world capitalism that the penetration of all spheres of human life by capitalist social relations is at its greatest. However, fragmentation is not due to the dominance of the text, discourse or the Hyper-reality of postmodern life. There are other causes. While there is some validity in the description of contemporary life as seemingly volatile and disconnected, this condition should not be taken for granted. The underlying and complex reasons for it, and not just its surface effects, must be pursued. However, identity politics is much more than just the experience of late capitalism's instability. It is also a personal assertion of identity based on a condition of marginality. The assertion of identity is no longer part of political activity; it can constitute the entire arena of activity. Politics becomes a matter of "style" and a contest of competing and proliferating identities. This risks political impotence, if the sole emphasis is on difference at the expense of any principle of equality. Under those circumstances, identity politics becomes hostile to any idea of a universal basis for social justice and a revolutionary transformation of society. But not all identities are treated equally. The more traditional identity of class is disavowed. It has always been interpreted as a foundation for solidarity, rather than fragmentation. The "new" identities have emerged in such a way that they displace this traditional category, according to the postmodernists.23 The Marxist notion of class rests ultimately on a theory of exploitation that assumes that the social formation has an underlying logic or coherence. In contrast, identity politics assumes multiple bases of power that generate multiple forms of oppression. These are seen as the sites in which power is contested, but rarely in forms of alliance or with reference to a broader political vision. As the category of class is discarded, so also are forms of political organisation and the connections between struggles that it implies. Indeed, even many of the grassroots campaigns of social movements that combated marginality in the 1970s and 1980s become suspect for the broad fronts that they entered. The institutional basis of marginalisation (racism, sexism, heterosexism) is neglected in this style of politics. Postmodern concerns with body, identity and difference displace the focus of theory, analysis and action from the institutional sites of power, such as the family, the state, work and school. All that remains, as a political orientation, is the mobilisation of identity in an ironic stance towards the institutions of power. The use of irony and a certain attitude to life is pitched as a gesture in itself towards power, one that avoids forming a counter-power. If this view has any value at all, some political judgment as to why one ironic posture is more potent or effective than any other would have to be exercised. But, it is not clear how postmodernists might do this, when the possible foundations of judgment debated by philosophers are themselves held in contempt.

#### Resisting capitalism is the ultimate ethical responsibility

Zizek and Daly 4 Slavoj and Glyn, Conversations with Zizek page 14-16

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization / anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties concerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it break with these types of positions 7 and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffee, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s populations. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral market place. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’). And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-particular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.

#### The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of historical materialism – this links social praxis to a decisive judgment on capitalism

Lukacs 67 George, Hungarian Marxist philosopher and literary critic. He is a founder of the tradition of Western Marxism. He contributed the ideas of reification and class consciousness to Marxist philosophy and theory, and his literary criticism was influential in thinking about realism and about the novel as a literary genre. He served briefly as Hungary's Minister of Culture as part of the government of the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic, History and Class Consciousness) <224-225>

Historical materialism has, therefore, a much greater value for the proletariat than that of a method of historical research. **It is one of** the most important of all its weapons. For the class struggleof the proletariat signifiesat the same time the awakening ofits class consciousness. And this awakening followed everywhere from an understanding of the true situation, of the actually existing historical connections. And it is this that gives the class struggleof the proletariat its special placeamong other class struggles, namely that it obtains its sharpest weapon from the hand of true science, from its clear insight into reality. Whereas in the class struggles of the past the most varied ideologies, religious, moral and other forms of 'false consciousness' were decisive, in the case of the class struggle of the proletariat, the war for the liberation of the last oppressed class**,** the revelation of the unvarnished truth became both a war-cry and the most potent weapon. By laying bare the springs of the historical process historical materialism became, in consequence of the class situation of the proletariat, an instrument of war. The most important function of historical materialism is to deliver a precise judgement on the capitalist social system, to unmask capitalist society. Throughout the class struggle of the proletariat, therefore, historical materialismhas constantly been used at every point, where, by means of all sorts of ideological frills, the bourgeoisie had concealed the true situation, the state of the class struggle; it has been used to focus the cold rays of science upon these veils and to show how false and misleading they were and how far they were in conflict with the truth**.** For this reason the chief function of historical materialism did not lie in the elucidation of pure scientific knowledge, but in the field of action. Historical materialism did not exist for its own sake, it existed so that the proletariat could understand a situation and so that, armed with this knowledge, it could act accordingly**.**

## Case

#### Their all or nothing approach ignores important legal reforms that are key to the transformative critical trans politics he advocates for. Organizing for legal reform radicalizes and motivates key resistance groups. This turns the case. The benefit of legal reforms far outweighs the risk of co-option.

Levi, The Director of the Transgender Rights Project of GLAD, and Shay, Co-Chair of the Corrections Committee of the ABA Criminal Justice Section, 2012 Jennifer Levi & Giovanna Shay, Jennifer Levi is the director of the Transgender¶ Rights Project of GLAD (Gay and Lesbian Advocates¶ and Defenders). Jennifer was co-counsel in the cases¶ achieving marriage equality for same-sex couples in Connecticut and Massachusetts and has participated¶ in successful efforts to pass transgender-inclusive¶ antidiscrimination laws throughout New England.¶ Giovanna Shay is a co-chair of the Corrections¶ Committee of the American Bar Association¶ Criminal Justice Section. She has participated in¶ institutional change litigation involving prisons, as¶ well as efforts to enforce the Prison Rape Elimination¶ Act (PREA) and amend the Prison Litigation Reform¶ Act (PLRA). Both serve on the faculty of Western¶ New England University School of Law.Western New England University School of Law¶ Western New England University School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series¶ No. 12-14¶ THE DANGERS OF REFORM: NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE,¶ CRITICAL TRANS POLITICS, AND THE LIMITS OF LAW Women's Review of Books Vol. 29, No. 4,July/Augw;t 2012

In adopting an all or nothing approach,¶ however, Spade fails to acknowledge ways in¶ which the liberal prisoners’ rights movement has helped to advance critical trans politics. At a minimum, prison reform litigation generated information, through civil discovery, that advocates used to draw attention to prison conditions. Access to prisoners has been facilitated by the minimal legal protections and professional norms that the¶ prisoners' rights movement helped to achieve.¶ Rather than undermining the radical project that¶ Spade promotes, liberal law-reform efforts¶ arguably laid foundations fo(. the prisonabolitionist¶ movement.¶ As for hate crimes prohibitions, Spade writes¶ that they "strengthen and legitimize the crilninal¶ punishment system," which targets poor people of¶ color and singles out poor trans people of color for¶ particular harassment. "Changing what the law¶ explicitly says about a group," he points out, "does¶ not necessarily remedy the structured insecurity¶ faced by that group." We ourselves are agnostic on¶ the question of hate crimes penalties for crimes¶ against LGBTQ people: the exclusion of sexual¶ orientation and gender identity from existing laws¶ not only minimizes the seriousness of anti-LGBTQ¶ violence but also nearly guarantees a dearth of law¶ enforcement resources. Nevertheless, we are also¶ acutely aware of the danger of expanding the¶ already massive criminal-punishment system in¶ anyway. In the context of mass incarceration, in which¶ reform can produce ever cleaner and more¶ technologically advanced human warehouses,¶ Spade's arguments are well-taken. His critique is¶ less persuasive when he moves into the broader¶ arena of LGBTQ rights. Spade believes that law¶ reform is at odds with distributive justice. In his¶ view, advocacy that departs from the idealized¶ approach he champions harms the transgender¶ community. While we laud his critique of some¶ elements of liberal law refom1, we disagree with his¶ zero-sum frame. Law reform is only one piece of a¶ strategy. It cannot achieve everything, but it is¶ sometimes a necessary precondition to reaching¶ other goals and, at a minimum, is not a causative¶ element for diminished opportunities and status. A¶ transgender equality movement that includes¶ expansion of antidiscrimination laws and marriage¶ equality among its goals is coextensive with the ~¶ project of "transformative change."¶ Spade argues that antidiscrimination laws¶ "create the false impression that,,, fairness has been¶ imposed, and the legitimacy of the distribution of¶ life chances restored." But such protections merely¶ ensure that a person's sexual orientation or gender¶ identity cannot be an obvious basis for an adverse¶ employment action. They are nowhere near broad¶ enough to proinise substantive equality, for¶ transgender people or anyone else. However, excluding gender identity and sexual orientation¶ from existing employment protections is far more damaging than committing the resources for the advocacy required to expand them. In addition,¶ organizing to pass antidiscrimination laws has¶ activated and radicalized LGBTQ advocacy¶ organizations. The California-based Transgender¶ Law Center (incubated by the National Center for¶ Lesbian Rights) and the Massachusetts Transgender¶ Political Coalition (first envisioned by GLAD staff¶ members and interns) are two examples of the generativity of liberal law reform efforts. Both¶ organizations share many of the distributive justice¶ goals of SRLP.¶ Spade is not the first to criticize the movement¶ for marriage equality for same-sex couples. In¶ "Arguing Against Arguing for Marriage"¶ (University of Pennsylvania Lnw Review, 2010),¶ Shannon Gilreath claims that "marriage is¶ dangerous for Gays conceptually, in its patriarchal¶ and heteropatriarchical foundations." In less¶ absolute terms, Katherine Franke writes in the New¶ York Times Gune 23, 2011) that same-sex marriage is¶ a "mixed blessing," which may undermine other¶ arrangements that LGBTQ people have used to¶ "order our lives in ways that have given us greater¶ freedom than can be found in the one-size-fits-all¶ rules of marriage."¶ Spade goes too far in applying the same critique¶ to both prison reform and marriage equality.¶ Removing gender discrimination from the¶ institution of marriage does not strengthen it in the¶ way that modifying the criminal-punishment¶ system reinforces mass incarceration. The¶ institution of marriage has an evolving social¶ meaning. Extending it to lesbians, gay men,¶ bisexual and transgender people reaffirms our¶ human dignity. Even the most steadfast critics of¶ the marriage-equality movement-including the¶ lesbian activists and law professors Nancy Polikoff and the late Paula Ettelbrick-have acknowledged¶ that critiques of marriage and the marriage equality -•¶ movement need not be on a collision course,¶ In addition, Spade ignores law-reform efforts¶ spearheaded by LGBTQ legal organizations other¶ than those focused on hate crimes, antidiscrimination,¶ and marriage. These include¶ challenges to discriminatory health care access and¶ to prison regularions that deny essential medical¶ care to transgender inmates; immigration reform¶ advocacy; and support for transgender students¶ and homeless LGBTQ youth. To ignore these efforts¶ is to miss the ocean for the tidal pool beside it.

#### AND---no risk of cooption offense---every tangible struggle on behalf of politicized queer demands alters the very makeup of the social order. A queer ethic should not identify with futurelessness but rather should affirm openness and political contingency.

Bateman 6 R Benjamin Bateman, doctoral candidate in English at the University of Virginia, Spring 2006, The Minnesota Review, online: http://www.theminnesotareview.org/journal/ns6566/bateman\_r\_benjamin\_ns6566\_stf1.shtml, accessed March 15, 2007

**The most telling moment in Edelman's book, and the most important for grasping the current state of queer theory, comes in its discussion of** Judith Butler's recent work, **Antigone**'s Claim. Antigone's plea, according to Butler, is that the life she lives and the love she harbors (for her brother) become intelligible in and through the Symbolic order. In other words, **Antigone functions for Butler as** something of a queer avant la lettre, **insisting, even from beyond the grave, that society acknowledge and accommodate her stigmatized desire and refusal of heterosexual reproduction**, that queers like her be spared a "social death" (Edelman 102). Butler's politics, Edelman complains, is one of liberal-humanist inclusiveness. Against Butler, **Edelman argues that the Symbolic will always be exclusionary and that Antigone represents a radical rejection of intelligibility**, a refusal to become recognizable on society's terms. Butler and Edelman thus give two strikingly different faces to queer theory. **The former advocates working in the social to achieve recognition for marginalized groups** and to making norms inhabitable and livable for queer sexualities; **the latter insists that queer must remain radically "other" to the dominant order**, perpetually disruptive and parasitic upon its smooth functioning. Certain readers might chafe at Edelman's suggestion that Butler's politics is insufficiently radical. After all, Butler has been criticized, like Edelman, for trafficking in recondite theories and postmodern argot and for failing to offer a viable model of political agency. To be sure, Butler's post-structuralist and Foucaultian commitments constrain her ability to posit a stable political agent and to conceive a politics that would radically oppose, rather than merely reinforce or marginally reinflect, a dominant cultural order. But in her recent work, perhaps most strikingly in 2004's Undoing Gender, Butler has turned to the "question of social transformation" (the title of UG's tenth chapter), arguing, quite programmatically, that social transformation "…is a question of developing, within law, within psychiatry, within social and literary theory, a new legitimating lexicon for the gender complexity that we have always been living" (219). Lest she be accused of nominalism, Butler stresses the importance of real bodies in forging such a vocabulary: "…the body is that which can occupy the norm in myriad ways, exceed the norm, rework the norm, and expose realities to which we thought we were confined as open to transformation" (217). **While Edelman rejects the future as a site of social reproduction, Butler prizes it as a space of** uncertainty**, an ambiguous terrain upon which competing and perhaps unforeseeable claims will be made and new social orders elaborated. Butler's model offers queer theory a brighter future than Edelman's, not simply because it confers agency upon social actors and highlights the social's capacity for transformation, but because it supersedes the liberal inclusiveness for which Edelman faults it. Butler's queer world is not one in which the dominant order remains stable as it incorporates, or ingests, peripheral sexualities into its fold**. Rather, it is one in which the periphery remakes the center, rearticulating what it means to be "normal" or "American" or "quee**r**." Thus, queers do not **simply** enter society on heterosexuality's terms**; they recast such terms, seizing upon instabilities in signification to elaborate previously unarticulated and perhaps unanticipatable ways of life. Edelman's point that 'queer' names "the resistance of the social to itself**" (2002) **combats the very anti-futurism he endorses; in this formulation, queerness functions as the force that prevents a particular social order from coinciding with itself, from congealing into a futureless nightmare. Queer, then, might denote the instability of all norms and social orders, their intrinsic capacity for change**.

#### They say social death---but that’s built in the claim that the social order can never be changed – this is wrong. Their psychoanalytic reading of the social body as always-already impervious to real change by queers and other movements is a reductive falsehood.

Brenkman 2 John Brenkman, Distinguished Professor of English and Comparative Literature at the CUNY Graduate Center and Baruch College, 2002, Narrative, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 189-190

**For Edelman the image of the child-as-future is more than a powerful trope** in the political discourse of the moment. **It in effect defines the political realm**: "For politics, however radical the means by which some of its practitioners seek to effect a more desirable social order, is conservative insofar as it necessarily works to affirm a social order, defining various strategies aimed at actualizing social reality and transmitting it into the future it aims to bequeath to its inner child" (19). **The burden of this argument is that a genuinely critical discourse cannot arise via the marking or symbolizing of the gap between the present and the future**. Such symbolizing has indeed been the defining feature of modern critical social discourse, whether among the Enlightenment's philosophes, French revolutionaries, Marxists, social democrats, or contemporary socialists and democrats. Jürgen Habermas, in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, defines modern time-consciousness itself as a taking of responsibility for the future. **Edelman sees in such a time-consciousness an inescapable trap. For him any such political discourse or activity steps into "the logic by which political engagement serves always as the medium for reproducing our social reality**" (26). **Certainly the political realm**—whether viewed from the perspective of the state, the political community and citizenship, or political movements—**is a medium of social reproduction, in the sense that it serves the relative continuity of innumerable economic and non-economic institutions. But it is not simply a mechanism of social reproduction; it is also the site and instrument of social change. Nor is it simply the field of existing power relations; it is also the terrain of contestation and compromise. Edelman compounds his** reductive concept **of the political realm by in turn postulating an ironclad intermeshing of social reproduction and sexual reproduction.** Here too **he takes a fundamental feature of modern society, or any society, and absolutizes it. Sexual reproduction is a necessary dimension of social reproduction**, almost by definition, in the sense that a society's survival depends upon, among many other things, the fact that its members reproduce. Kinship practices, customs, religious authorities, and civil and criminal law variously regulate sexual reproduction. **However, that is not to say that** the imperatives of social reproduction dictate or determine or fully functionalize the institutions and practices of sexual reproduction. **The failure to recognize the relative autonomy of those institutions and practices underestimates how seriously feminism and the gay and lesbian movement have already challenged the norms and institutions of compulsory heterosexuality** in our society. **They have done so through creative transformations in civil society and everyday life and through cultural initiatives and political and legal reforms**. The anti-abortion and anti-gay activism of the Christian Right arose, in response, to alter and reverse the fundamental achievements of these movements.

#### Political engagement isn’t just queer assimilation – it radically changes the terms of the political itself. The social order is NOT inevitably exclusive to queers – working through the political process can and does produce not just a *better* but a *different* social order for queers.

Brenkman 2 John Brenkman, Distinguished Professor of English and Comparative Literature at the CUNY Graduate Center and Baruch College, 2002, Narrative, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 189-190

**Innovation is a crucial concept for understanding the gay and lesbian movement**, which emerged from within civil society as **citizens** who were stigmatized and often criminalized for their sexual lives **created new forms of association, transformed their own lifeworld, and organized a political offensive on behalf of political and social reforms. There was an innovation of rights and freedoms, and what I have called innovations in sociality**. Contrary to the liberal interpretation of liberal rights and freedoms, **I do not think that gays and lesbians have merely sought their place at the table. Their struggle has radically altered the scope and meaning of the liberal rights and freedoms they sought**, first and foremost by making them include sexuality, sexual practices, and the shape of household and family. **Where the movement has succeeded in changing the laws of the state, it has also opened up new possibilities within civil society**. To take an obvious example, **wherever it becomes unlawful to deny housing to individuals because they are gay, there is set in motion a transformation of the everyday life of neighborhoods, including the lives of heterosexuals and their children**. [End Page 188] **Within civil society, this is a work of enlightenment, however uneven and fraught and frequently dangerous. It is not a reaffirmation of the symbolic and structural underpinnings of homophobia; on the contrary,** it is a challenge to homophobia **and a volatilizing of social relations within the nonpolitical realm**.

#### Queer politics should be affirmative and optimistic about the possibility of creating a better world, even as it rejects specifically reproductive futurism in other ways than by embodying the death drive.

Snediker 6 Michael Snediker, Visiting Assistant Professor of American Literature at Mount Holyoke College, 2006, Postmodern Culture, Vol. 16, No. 3

Juxtaposed with Lee Edelman's 2004 book, No Future, the orchestratively powerful but nonetheless opaque queer pessimism of the above theorists would seem like kid stuff (to invoke Edelman's own charged turn to this formulation). The queer pessimism of Butler and Bersani, circuited from text to text in a persuasiveness inseparable from its occludedness, brings to mind Jean Laplanche's enigmatic signifier.[17](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/pmc/v016/16.3snediker.html#foot17) **Edelman's queer pessimism**, by contrast, **insistent on its own absolute non-enigmatic unequivocality, might suggest the draconian bravura of a superego** were Edelman's project not so pitted against the superego, pitted against all forms of stable identity except the "irreducible" (No Future 6) identity of the death drive. **Though moving beyond the strictures of psychoanalysis, it is difficult for me not to hear in the sheer absoluteness of Edelman's dicta something like a superego's militancy.** ¶ **Edelman insists that "the only oppositional status to which our queerness could ever lead would depend on our taking seriously the place of the death drive** we're called on to figure" (30). Edelman, as the passage I've cited suggests, doesn't seem to leave queers a lot of options, even as the option he adjures hardly seems self-evident. The egregious militancy of No Future presents an apogee **of** what I've been calling queer pessimism. Or if not an apogee, then a sort of pessimism-drag. My own thinking differs from Edelman's in many ways, and might often go without saying.[18](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/pmc/v016/16.3snediker.html#foot18) **How**, for instance, **could a project attached to queer optimism not bristle at a book that insists unilaterally that "the only oppositional status" available to queers demands fealty to the death drive? Edelman's book certainly trounces optimism, but the optimism he trounces is not the optimism for which my own project lobbies**. Edelman writes thus: ¶ The structuring optimism of politics to which the order of meaning commits us, installing as it does the perpetual hope of reaching meaning through signification, is always, I would argue, a negation of this primal, constitutive, and negative act. And the various positivities produced in its wake by the logic of political hope depend on the mathematical illusion that negated negations might somehow escape, and not redouble, such negativity. My polemic thus stakes its fortunes on a truly hopeless wager: that taking the Symbolic's negativity to the very letter of the law . . . that turning the force of queerness against all subjects, however queer, can afford an access to the jouissance that at once defines us and negates us. Or better: can expose the constancy, the inescapability, of such access to jouissance in the social order itself, even if that order can access its constant access to jouissance only in the process of abjecting that constancy of access onto the queer. (5) ¶ As I've made clear, and as this essay's final section will make clearer, **queer optimism is no more attached to "the logic of political hope" than No Future is**. Even as I think there are some forms of hope worth defending, I'm not interested, for present purposes, in demarcating good and bad hopes, hegemonic and nonhegemonic attachments to futurity. **To the extent that my own project seeks to recuperate optimism's potential critical interest by arguing for its separability from the promissory, I'm here insisting that there are ways of resisting a pernicious logic of "reproductive futurism" besides embodying the death drive. If Edelman opines that all forms of optimism eventually lead to Little Orphan Annie singing "Tomorrow**," and therefore that all forms of optimism must be met with queer death-driven irony's "always explosive force" (31), **I oppositely insist that optimism's limited cultural and theoretical intelligibility might not call for optimism's grandiose excoriation, but for optimism to be rethought along non-futural lines**. Edelman's hypostasization of optimism accepts optimism as at best simplistic and at worst fascistic. This hypostasization leaves unthinkable queer optimism's own proposition that the reduction of optimism to a diachronic, futurally bound axis is itself the outcome of a machinery that spits out optimism as junk, and renders suspicious any form of "enjoyment" that isn't a (mis)translation of jouissance, "a violent passage beyond the bounds of identity, meaning, and law" (25), the production of "identity as mortification." Enjoyment, anyone?

#### Affirming radical negativity is a dead end for *actual* queer politics – there’s no one listening to their demand for an affirmation of negativity, and those demands only trade off with on-balance better forms of queer activism.

Bateman 6 R Benjamin Bateman, doctoral candidate in English at the University of Virginia, Spring 2006, The Minnesota Review, online: http://www.theminnesotareview.org/journal/ns6566/bateman\_r\_benjamin\_ns6566\_stf1.shtml, accessed March 15, 2007

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Walters’ conclusions are well-made. On the positive side she argues that ‘we should embrace [queer theory’s] recognition that much slips out of the rigid distinctions of hetero/homo, man/woman and that our theoretical and political engagements need to reckon creatively with the excess that dares not speak its name’**. She** also **commends the ‘queer attempt to understand that sexuality and sexual desire is not reducible to gender’** (Walters 1996: 963). Nevertheless she is skeptical that destabilizing gender can ‘top the power of gender- a power that still sends too many women to the hospital, shelter, rape crisis center, despair’ (ibid.: 866). She observes, “we cannot afford to lose sight of the materiality of oppression and its operation in structural and institutional spaces’, and she suspects that queer theory fails to understand that ‘[d]estabilizing gender (or rendering its surface apparent) is not the same as overthrowing it’ (ibid.).

# Case

#### Affirming radical negativity is a dead end for *actual* queer politics – there’s no one listening to their demand for an affirmation of negativity, and those demands only trade off with on-balance better forms of queer activism.

Bateman 6 R Benjamin Bateman, doctoral candidate in English at the University of Virginia, Spring 2006, The Minnesota Review, online: http://www.theminnesotareview.org/journal/ns6566/bateman\_r\_benjamin\_ns6566\_stf1.shtml, accessed March 15, 2007

Queer theorists more politically programmatic than Edelman frequently neglect this point. Michael Warner, for example, accuses gays and lesbians who aspire to marriage of caving, in assimilationist fashion, to heterosexual norms perceived as demands. But queers never exist completely outside such norms**—and thus cannot, logically, succumb to them—and marriage and childrearing might not look the same with gays on board**. After all, gays who have been traumatized by their parents' homophobia and lessons of compulsory heterosexuality are probably less likely than their heterosexual counterparts to repeat such mistakes. **Insofar as married gays retain connections to less traditional elements of queer culture, we cannot assume that they will abandon their fights for sexual freedom, conform entirely to all matrimonial traditions, or turn their backs upon their promiscuous peers**. Some might, but many will not. Edelman's book works well as an intensely academic polemic but as a political resource it proves insufficient. **If queer theory is to have** a social impact**, it must interpellate the gay and lesbian audience to whom, after all, it is primarily addressed. Few of these people**, we can safely assume, **want to live in a void or die Antigone's death**. Queer culture **should keep insisting that we not sacrifice present, pressing needs to heterosexual fantasies, but to secure its future it must imagine a political order in which the needs of children are not inimical to the interests of queers**, and it must celebrate—as Eve Sedgwick does so passionately in "How to Grow Your Kids Up Gay" – that which is most queer, and queer-able, in children.

# T

#### “Statutory” restrictions are binding law enacted by Congress

**Hill 13** – Gerald Hill, Juris Doctor from Hastings College of the Law of the University of California, Executive Director of the California Governor's Housing Commission, AB from Stanford University and Kathleen Hill, M.A. in Political Psychology from California State University, Sonoma, Fellow in Public Affairs at the Coro Foundation, The People's Law Dictionary, http://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=2010

statute

n. a Federal or state written law **enacted by** the **Congress** or state legislature, respectively. Local statutes or laws are usually called "ordinances." **Regulations**, **rulings**, **opinions**, **executive orders** and **proclamations** are **not statutes**.

#### “Judicial” is courts --- distinct from other actors

**Webster’s 1** – Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law, “Judicial”, http://research.lawyers.com/glossary/judicial.html

Judicial

Definition - adj

[Latin judicialis, from judicium judgment, from judic- judex judge, from jus right, law + dicere to determine, say]

1 a : of or relating to a judgment, the function of judging, the administration of justice, or the judiciary

b : of, relating to, or being the branch of government that is charged with trying all cases that involve the government and with the administration of justice within its jurisdiction

compare **administrative** **executive** **legislative**

2 : created, ordered, or enforced by a court <a ~ foreclosure>

compare conventional legal

Pronunciation jü-'di-sh&l

#### A topical version of the aff would solve- it’s capable of radical change

Orly Lobel 7, University of San Diego Assistant Professor of Law, 2007, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics,” 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/lobel.pdf

V. RESTORING CRITICAL OPTIMISM IN THE LEGAL FIELD “La critique est aisée; l’art difficile.” A critique of cooptation often takes an uneasy path. Critique has always been and remains not simply an intellectual exercise but a political and moral act. The question we must constantly pose is how critical accounts of social reform models contribute to our ability to produce scholarship and action that will be constructive. To critique the ability of law to produce social change is inevitably to raise the question of alternatives. In and of itself, the exploration of the limits of law and the search for new possibilities is an insightful field of inquiry. However, the contemporary message that emerges from critical legal consciousness analysis has often resulted in the distortion of the critical arguments themselves. This distortion denies the potential of legal change in order to illuminate what has yet to be achieved or even imagined. Most importantly, cooptation analysis is not unique to legal reform but can be extended to any process of social action and engagement. When claims of legal cooptation are compared to possible alternative forms of activism, the false necessity embedded in the contemporary story emerges — a story that privileges informal extralegal forms as transformative while assuming that a conservative tilt exists in formal legal paths. In the triangular conundrum of “law and social change,” law is regularly the first to be questioned, deconstructed, and then critically dismissed. The other two components of the equation — social and change — are often presumed to be immutable and unambiguous. Understanding the limits of legal change reveals the dangers of absolute reliance on one system and the need, in any effort for social reform, to contextualize the discourse, to avoid evasive, open-ended slogans, and to develop greater sensitivity to indirect effects and multiple courses of action. **Despite its weaknesses, however, law is an** optimistic discipline. It operates both in the present and in the future. **Order without law is often the** privilege of the strong. Marginalized groups have used legal reform precisely because they lacked power. Despite limitations, these groups have often successfully secured their interests through legislative and judicial victories. **Rather than experiencing a** disabling disenchantment **with the legal system, we can** learn from both the successes and failures **of past models, with the aim of** constantly redefining the boundaries of legal reform **and making visible law’s broad reach**.

#### Formal rules are key to deliberation and prevent marginalization

Tonn 5 Mari Boor, Professor of Communication – University of Maryland, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs, Vol. 8, Issue 3, Fall

This widespread recognition that access to public deliberative processes and the ballot is a baseline of any genuine democracy points to the most curious irony of the conversation movement: portions of its constituency. Numbering among the most fervid dialogic loyalists have been some feminists and multiculturalists who represent groups historically denied both the right to speak in public and the ballot. Oddly, some feminists who championed the slogan “The Personal Is Political” to emphasize ways relational power can oppress tend to ignore similar dangers lurking in the appropriation of conversation and dialogue in public deliberation. Yet the conversational model’s emphasis on empowerment through intimacy can duplicate the power networks that traditionally excluded females and nonwhites and gave rise to numerous, sometimes necessarily uncivil, demands for democratic inclusion. Formalized participation structures in deliberative processes obviously cannot ensure the elimination of relational power blocs, but, as Freeman pointed out, the absence of formal rules leaves relational power unchecked and potentially capricious. Moreover, the privileging of the self, personal experiences, and individual perspectives of reality intrinsic in the conversational paradigm mirrors justifications once used by dominant groups who used their own lives, beliefs, and interests as templates for hegemonic social premises to oppress women, the lower class, and people of color. Paradigms infused with the therapeutic language of emotional healing and coping likewise flirt with the type of psychological diagnoses once ascribed to disaffected women. But as Betty Friedan’s landmark 1963 The Feminist Mystique argued, the cure for female alienation was neither tranquilizers nor attitude adjustments fostered through psychotherapy but, rather, unrestricted opportunities.102 The price exacted by promoting approaches to complex public issues— models that cast conventional deliberative processes, including the marshaling of evidence beyond individual subjectivity, as “elitist” or “monologic”—can be steep. Consider comments of an aide to President George W. Bush made before reports concluding Iraq harbored no weapons of mass destruction, the primary justification for a U.S.-led war costing thousands of lives. Investigative reporters and other persons sleuthing for hard facts, he claimed, operate “in what we call the reality-based community.” Such people “believe that solutions emerge from [the] judicious study of discernible reality.” Then baldly flexing the muscle afforded by increasingly popular social-constructionist and poststructuralist models for conflict resolution, he added: “That’s not the way the world really works anymore . . . We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you’re studying that reality— judiciously, as you will—we’ll act again, creating other new realities.”103 The recent fascination with public conversation and dialogue most likely is a product of frustration with the tone of much public, political discourse. Such concerns are neither new nor completely without merit. Yet, as Burke insightfully pointed out nearly six decades ago, “A perennial embarrassment in liberal apologetics has arisen from its ‘surgical’ proclivity: its attempt to outlaw a malfunction by outlawing the function.” The attempt to eliminate flaws in a process by eliminating the entire process, he writes, “is like trying to eliminate heart disease by eliminating hearts.”104 Because public argument and deliberative processes are the “heart” of true democracy, supplanting those models with social and therapeutic conversation and dialogue jeopardizes the very pulse and lifeblood of democracy itself.

#### Switch-side debate prevents moral dogmatism

Muir 93 Star, Prof. Comm. – George Mason U., Philosophy and Rhetoric, “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate”, 26(4), pp. 288-290

Values clarification, Stewart is correct in pointing out, does not mean that no values are developed. Two very important values— tolerance and fairness—inhere to a significant degree in the ethics of switch-side debate. A second point about the charge of relativism is that tolerance is related to the development of reasoned moral viewpoints. The willingness to recognize the existence of other views, and to grant alternative positions a degree of credibility, is a value fostered by switch-side debate: Alternately debating both sides of the same question . . . inculcates a deep-seated attitude of tolerance toward differing points of view. To be forced to debate only one side leads to an ego-identification with that side. , . . The other side in contrast is seen only as something to be discredited. Arguing as persuasively as one can for completely opposing views is one way of giving recognition to the idea that a strong case can generally be made for the views of earnest and intelligent men, however such views may clash with one's own. . . .Promoting this kind of tolerance is perhaps one of the greatest benefits debating both sides has to offer. 5' Theactivity should encourage debating both sides of a topic, reasons Thompson, because debaters are "more likely to realize that propositions are bilateral. It is those who fail to recognize this fact who become intolerant, dogmatic, and bigoted.""\* While Theodore Roosevelt can hardly be said to be advocating bigotry, his efforts to turn out advocates convinced of their rightness is not a position imbued with tolerance. At a societal level, the value of tolerance is more conducive to a fair and open assessment of competing ideas. John Stuart Mill eloquently states the case this way: Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human faculties have any rational assurance of being right. . . . the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race. . . . If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of the truth, produced by its collision with error."\*' At an individual level, tolerance is related to moral identity via empathic and critical assessments of differing perspectives. Paul posits a strong relationship between tolerance, empathy, and critical thought. Discussing the function of argument in everyday life, he observes that in order to overcome natural tendencies to reason egocentrically and sociocentrically, individuals must gain the capacity to engage in self-refiective questioning, to reason dialogically and dialectically. and to "reconstruct alien and opposing belief systems empathically."\*- Our system of beliefs is. by definition, irrational when we are incapable of abandoning a belief for rational reasons; that is, when we egocentrically associate our beliefs with our own integrity. Paul describes an intimate relationship between private inferential habits, moral practices, and the nature of argumentation. Critical thought and moral identity, he urges, must be predicated on discovering the insights of opposing views and the weaknesses of our own beliefs. Role playing, he reasons, is a central element of any effort to gain such insight. Only an activity that requires the defense of both sides of an issue, moving beyond acknowledgement to exploration and advocacy, can engender such powerful role playing. Redding explains that "debating both sides is a special instance of role-playing,""" where debaters are forced to empathize on a constant basis with a position contrary to their own. This role playing, Baird agrees, is an exercise in reflective thinking, an engagement in problem solving that exposes weaknesses and strengths,\*\* Motivated by the knowledge that they may debate against their own case, debaters constantly pose arguments and counter-arguments for discussion, erecting defenses and then challenging these defenses with a different tact."\*' Such conceptual flexibility, Paul argues, is essential for effective critical thinking, and in turn for the development of a reasoned moral identity.

#### Debate role-play activates agency

Hanghoj 8 Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 ¶ Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish¶ Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of¶ Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have¶ taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the¶ Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab¶ Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant¶ professor.

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf¶

Thus, debate games require teachers to balance the centripetal/centrifugal forces of gaming and teaching, to be able to reconfigure their discursive authority, and to orchestrate the multiple voices of a dialogical game space in relation to particular goals. These Bakhtinian perspectives provide a valuable analytical framework for describing the discursive interplay between different practices and knowledge aspects when enacting (debate) game scenarios. In addition to this, Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy also offers an explanation of why debate games (and other game types) may be valuable within an educational context. One of the central features of multi-player games is that players are expected to experience a simultaneously real and imagined scenario both in relation to an insider’s (participant) perspective and to an outsider’s (co-participant) perspective. According to Bakhtin, the outsider’s perspective reflects a fundamental aspect of human understanding: In order to understand, it is immensely important for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her creative understanding – in time, in space, in culture. For one cannot even really see one's own exterior and comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real exterior can be seen and understood only by other people, because they are located outside us in space, and because they are others (Bakhtin, 1986: 7). As the quote suggests, every person is influenced by others in an inescapably intertwined way, and consequently no voice can be said to be isolated. Thus, it is in the interaction with other voices that individuals are able to reach understanding and find their own voice. Bakhtin also refers to the ontological process of finding a voice as “ideological becoming”, which represents “the process of selectively assimilating the words of others” (Bakhtin, 1981: 341). Thus, by teaching and playing debate scenarios, it is possible to support students in their process of becoming not only themselves, but also in becoming articulate and responsive citizens in a democratic society.

#### A focus on policy is necessary to learn the pragmatic details of powerful institutions

McClean 1 Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at Molloy College in New York, 2001, David E., “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope”, Conference of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, http://www.americanphilosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/

Or we might take Foucault who, at best, has provided us with what may reasonably be described as a very long and eccentric footnote to Nietzsche (I have once been accused, by a Foucaltian true believer, of "gelding" Foucault with other similar remarks). Foucault, who has provided the Left of the late 1960s through the present with such notions as "governmentality," "Limit," "archeology," "discourse" "power" and "ethics," creating or redefining their meanings, has made it overabundantly clear that all of our moralities and practices are the successors of previous ones which derive from certain configurations of savoir and connaisance arising from or created by, respectively, the discourses of the various scientific schools. But I have not yet found in anything Foucault wrote or said how such observations may be translated into apolitical movement or hammered into a political document or theory (let alone public policies) that can be justified or founded on more than an arbitrary aesthetic experimentalism. In fact, Foucault would have shuddered if any one ever did, since he thought that anything as grand as a movement went far beyond what he thought appropriate. This leads me to mildly rehabilitate Habermas, for at least he has been useful in exposing Foucault's shortcomings in this regard, just as he has been useful in exposing the shortcomings of others enamored with the abstractions of various Marxian-Freudian social critiques.Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group,those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing lessthan a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

#### Individual focus is insufficient institutional focus is critical to end oppression

Jensen 5 Robert Jensen, Texas University Journalism Professor, Nowar Collective Founder, 2005, The Heart of Whiteness, p.78-87

I'm all for diversity and its institutional manifestation, multiculturalism. But we should be concerned about the way in which talk of diversity and multiculturalism has proceeded. After more than a decade of university teaching and political work, it is clear to me that a certain kind of diversity-talk actually can impede our understanding of oppression by encouraging us to focus on the cultural and individual, rather than on the political and structural. Instead of focusing on diversity, we should focus on power. The fundamental frame for pursuing analyses of issues around race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and class should be not cultural but political, not individual but structural. Instead of talking about diversity in race, class, gender, and sexual orientation, we should critique white supremacy, economic inequality in capitalism, patriarchy, and heterosexism. We should talk about systems and structures of power, about ideologies of domination and subordination—and about the injuries done to those in subordinate groups, and the benefits and privileges that accrue to those in dominant groups. Here's an example of what I mean: A professor colleague, a middle-aged heterosexual white man, once told me that he thought his contribution to the world—his way of aiding progressive causes around diversity issues—came by expanding his own understanding of difference and then working to be the best person he could he. He said he felt no obligation to get involved in the larger world outside his world of family and friends, work and church. In the worlds in which he found himself personal and professional, he said he tried to be kind and caring to all, working to understand and celebrate difference and diversity. There are two obvious problems with his formulation, one concerning him as an individual and one concerning the larger world. First, without a connection to a political struggle, it is difficult for anyone to grow morally and politically. My own experience has taught me that it is when I am engaged in political activity with people across identity lines that I learn the most. It is in those spaces and those relationships that my own hidden prejudices and unexamined fears emerge, in situations in which comrades whom I trust call hold me accountable. Without that kind of engagement, I rarely get to levels of honesty with people that can propel me forward. The colleague in question saw himself as being, as the cliché goes, a sensitive new age guy, but from other sources I know that he continued to behave in sexist ways in the classroom. Because he had no connection to a feminist movement—or any other liberatory movement where women might observe his behavior and he in a position to hold him accountable— there was no systematic way for him to correct his sexist habits. His self-image as a liberated man was possible only because he made sure he wasn't in spaces where women could easily challenge him. The second problem is that if everyone with privilege — especially the levels of privilege this man had—decided that all they were obligated to do in the world was to be nice to the people around them and celebrate diversity, it is difficult to imagine progressive social change ever taking place. Yes, we all must change at the micro level, in our personal relationships, if the struggle for justice is to move forward. But struggle in the personal arena is not enough; it is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for change. Lots of white people could make significant progress toward eliminating all vestiges of racism in our own psyches—which would be a good thing—without it having any tangible effect on the systems and structures of power in which white supremacy is manifested. It would not change the ways in which we benefit from being white in that system. It doesn't mean we shouldn't "work on" ourselves, only that working on ourselves is not enough. is possible to not be racist (in the individual sense of not perpetrating overtly racist acts) and yet at the same time fail to be antiracist (in the political sense of resisting a racist system). Being not-racist is not enough. To he a fully moral person, one must find some way to be antiracist as we Because white people benefit from living in a white-supremacist society, there is an added obligation for us to struggle against the injustice of that system. The same argument holds in other realms as well. Men can be successful at not being sexist (in the sense of treating women as equals and refraining from sexist behaviors) but fail at being antisexist if we do nothing to acknowledge the misogynistic sys- tern in which we live and try to intervene where possible to change that system. The same can be said about straight people who are relatively free of antigay prejudice but do nothing to challenge heterosexism, or about economically privileged people who do nothing to confront the injustice of the economic system, or about U.S. citizens who don't seek to exploit people from other places but do nothing to confront the violence of the U.S. empire abroad. We need a political and structural, rather than a cultural and individual, framework. Of course we should not ignore differences in cultural practices, and individuals should work to change themselves. But celebrating cultural differences and focusing on one's own behavior are inadequate to the task in front of us. I have been clearer on that since September 11, 2001 after which George W. Bush kept repeating "Islam is a religion of peace," reminding Americans that as we march off on wars of domination we should respect the religion of the people we are killing. Across the United States after 9/11, people were saying, "I have to learn more about Islam."

#### Debating about the state does not mean capitulating to it- discussing government policy creates critical understanding that facilitates resistance against its worst abuses

Donovan and Larkin 6 Clair and Phil, Australian National University, Politics, Vol. 26, No. 1

We do not suggest that political science should merely fall into line with the government instrumentalism that we have identified, becoming a 'slave social science' (see Donovan, 2005). But, we maintain that political scientists should be able to engage with practical politics on their own terms and should be able to provide research output that is of value to practitioners. It is because of its focus on understanding, explanation, conceptualisation and classification that political science has the potential to contribute more to practical politics, and more successfully. As Brian Barry notes, 'Granting (for the sake of argument) that [students of politics] have some methods that enable us to improve on the deliverances of untutored common sense or political journalism, what good do they do? The answer to that question is: not much. But if we change the question and ask what good they could do, I believe that it is possible to justify a more positive answer' (Bany, 2004, p. 22). A clear understanding of how institutions and individuals interact or how different institutions interact with each other can provide clear and useful insights that practitioners can successfully use, making - or perhaps remaking - a political science that 'directs research efforts to good questions and enables incremental improvements to be made' (ibid., 19). In this sense, political science already has the raw material to maake this contribution, but it chooses not to utilise it in this way: no doubt, in part, because academics are motivated to present their findings to other academics and not the practitioners within the institutions they study.

#### Explodes Limits- their interp justifies any individual ideology becoming an aff- overstretches our research burden.

Sládek 7 Ondřej Sládek 7, researcher in the Narratology Section, Institute for Czech Literature, Czech Academy of Sciences, Between History and Fiction: On the Possibilities of Alternative History, 2007, <http://www.flu.cas.cz/fictionality2/sladek.pdf>

Almost every historian must have been tempted to ask the question: "What would have happened, if.?" What would have happened if there had been no French Revolution of 1789? What if Napoleon had won the battle of Waterloo? Or vice versa: What if he had lost the battle of Austerlitz? What would European have history looked like? What would have happened if there was no American Revolutionary War? What would have happened had the Munich Agreement never been signed? What would have happened if. **One may ask** dozens, or hundreds of these and similar speculative questions. They may serve us to generate answers - histories that have never happened, although they could have.

#### Fairness is a prior question- rigorous testing is key to understand if they education provided is useful

Zappen 4 James, Prof. Language and Literature – Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, “The Rebirth of Dialogue: Bakhtin, Socrates, and the Rhetorical Tradition”, p. 35-36

Finally, Bakhtin describes the Socratic dialogue as a carnivalesque debate between opposing points of view, with a ritualistic crownings and decrownings of opponents. I call this Socratic form of debate a contesting of ideas to capture the double meaning of the Socratic debate as both a mutual testing of oneself and others and a contesting or challenging of others' ideas and their lives. Brickhouse and Smith explain that Socrates' testing of ideas and people is a mutual testing not only of others but also of himself: Socrates claims that he has been commanded by the god to examine himself as well as others; he claims that the unexamined life is not worth living; and, since he rarely submits to questioning himself, "it must be that in the process of examining others Socrates regards himself as examining his own life, too." Such a mutual testing of ideas provides the only claim to knowledge that Socrates can have: since neither he nor anyone else knows the real definitions of things, he cannot claim to have any knowledge of his own; since, however, he subjects his beliefs to repeated testing, he can claim to have that limited human knowledge supported by the "inductive evidence" of "previous elenctic examinations." This mutual testing of ideas and people is evident in the Laches and also appears in the Gorgias in Socrates' testing of his own belief that courage is inseparable from the other virtues and in his willingness to submit his belief and indeed his life to the ultimate test of divine judgment, in what Bakhtin calls a dialogue on the threshold. The contesting or challenging of others' ideas and their lives and their ritualistic crowning/decrowning is evident in the Gorgias in Soocrates' successive refutations and humiliations of Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles.

#### Their attempt to exclude the negative obliterates the pedagogical benefits of in-round dialogue. Fairness norms are vital because they allow both teams to be heard in a meaningful way.

Galloway 7 professor of communication at Samford University, Ryan, “DINNER AND CONVERSATION AT THE ARGUMENTATIVE TABLE: RECONCEPTUALIZING DEBATE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE DIALOGUE”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28 (2007), ebsco

A second reason to reject the topic has to do with its exclusivity. Many teams argue that because topicality and other fairness constraints prevent particular speech acts, debaters are denied a meaningful voice in the debate process. Advocates argue that because the negative excludes a particular affirmative performance that they have also precluded the affirmative team. The problem with this line of reasoning is that it views exclusion as a unitary act of definitional power. However, a dialogical perspective allows us to see power flowing both ways. A large range of affirmative cases necessitates fewer negative strategies that are relevant to the range of such cases. If the affirmative can present any case it desires, the benefits of the research, preparation, and in-depth thinking that go into the creation of negative strategies are diminished, if not eviscerated entirely. The affirmative case is obliged to invite a negative response. In addition, even when the negative strategy is not entirely excluded, any strategy that diminishes argumentative depth and quality diminishes the quality of in-round dialogue. An affirmative speech act that flagrantly violates debate fairness norms and claims that the benefits of the affirmative act supersede the need for such guidelines has the potential of excluding a meaningful negative response, and undermines the pedagogical benefits of the in-round dialogue. The “germ of a response” (Bakhtin, 1990) is stunted. While affirmative teams often accuse the negative of using a juridical rule to exclude them, the affirmative also relies upon an unstated rule to exclude the negative response. This unstated but understood rule is that the negative speech act must serve to negate the affirmative act. Thus, affirmative teams often exclude an entire range of negative arguments, including arguments designed to challenge the hegemony, domination, and oppression inherent in topical approaches to the resolution. Becoming more than just a ritualistic tag-line of “fairness, education, time skew, voting issue,” fairness exists in the implicit right to be heard in a meaningful way. Ground is just that—a ground to stand on, a ground to speak from, a ground by which to meaningfully contribute to an ongoing conversation. Conversely, in a dialogical exchange, debaters come to realize the positions other than their own have value, and that reasonable minds can disagree on controversial issues. This respect encourages debaters to modify and adapt their own positions on critical issues without the threat of being labeled a hypocrite. The conceptualization of debate as a dialogue allows challenges to take place from a wide variety of perspectives. By offering a stable referent the affirmative must uphold, the negative can choose to engage the affirmative on the widest possible array of “counterwords,” enhancing the pedagogical process produced by debate. Additionally, debate benefits activism by exposing the participants to a wide range of points of view on topics of public importance. A debater starting their career in the fall of 2005 would have debated about China, landmark Supreme Court decisions, Middle East policy, and agricultural policy. It is unsurprising that many debaters contend that debate is one of the most educationally valuable experiences of their lives. Thus, the unique distinctions between debate and public speaking allow debaters the opportunity to learn about a wide range of issues from multiple perspectives. This allows debaters to formulate their own opinions about controversial subjects through an in-depth process of research and testing of ideas. Putting the cart before the horse by assuming that one knows that the resolution is oppressive and cannot be meaningfully affirmed denies debaters the ability to craft a nuanced answer to the question posed by the resolution.

#### Policy relevant deliberation is the only way to alter war powers

Mellor 13 The Australian National University, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, Department Of International Relations,   
“Why policy relevance is a moral necessity: Just war theory, impact, and UAVs,” European University Institute, Paper Prepared for BISA Conference 2013, DOA: 8-14-13, y2k

This section of the paper considers more generally the need for just war theorists to engage with policy debate about the use of force, as well as to engage with the more fundamental moral and philosophical principles of the just war tradition. It draws on John Kelsay’s conception of just war thinking as being a social practice,35 as well as on Michael Walzer’s understanding of the role of the social critic in society.36 It argues that the just war tradition is a form of “practical discourse” which is concerned with questions of “how we should act.”37 Kelsay argues that: [T]he criteria of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a framework for structured participation in a public conversation about the use of military force . . . citizens who choose to speak in just war terms express commitments . . . [i]n the process of giving and asking for reasons for going to war, those who argue in just war terms seek to influence policy by persuading others that their analysis provides a way to express and fulfil the desire that military actions be both wise and just.38 He also argues that “good just war thinking involves continuous and complete deliberation, in the sense that one attends to all the standard criteria at war’s inception, at its end, and throughout the course of the conflict.”39 This is important as it highlights the need for just war scholars to engage with the ongoing operations in war and the specific policies that are involved. The question of whether a particular war is just or unjust, and the question of whether a particular weapon (like drones) can be used in accordance with the jus in bello criteria, only cover a part of the overall justice of the war. Without an engagement with the reality of war, in terms of the policies used in waging it, it is impossible to engage with the “moral reality of war,”40 in terms of being able to discuss it and judge it in moral terms Kelsay’s description of just war thinking as a social practice is similar to Walzer’s more general description of social criticism. The just war theorist, as a social critic, must be involved with his or her own society and its practices. In the same way that the social critic’s distance from his or her society is measured in inches and not miles,41 the just war theorist must be close to and must understand the language through which war is constituted, interpreted and reinterpreted.42 It is only by understanding the values and language that their own society purports to live by that the social critic can hold up a mirror to that society to demonstrate its hypocrisy and to show the gap that exists between its practice and its values.43 The tradition itself provides a set of values and principles and, as argued by Cian O’Driscoll, constitutes a “language of engagement” to spur participation in public and political debate.44 This language is part of “our common heritage, the product of many centuries of arguing about war.”45 These principles and this language provide the terms through which people understand and come to interpret war, not in a deterministic way but by providing the categories necessary for moral understanding and moral argument about the legitimate and illegitimate uses of force.46 By spurring and providing the basis for political engagement the just war tradition ensures that the acts that occur within war are considered according to just war criteria and allows policy-makers to be held to account on this basis. Engaging with the reality of war requires recognising that war is, as Clausewitz stated, a continuation of policy. War, according to Clausewitz, is subordinate to politics and to political choices and these political choices can, and must, be judged and critiqued.47 Engagement and political debate are morally necessary as the alternative is disengagement and moral quietude, which is a sacrifice of the obligations of citizenship.48 This engagement must bring just war theorists into contact with the policy makers and will require work that is accessible and relevant to policy makers, however this does not mean a sacrifice of critical distance or an abdication of truth in the face of power. By engaging in detail with the policies being pursued and their concordance or otherwise with the principles of the just war tradition the policy-makers will be forced to account for their decisions and justify them in just war language. In contrast to the view, suggested by Kenneth Anderson, that “the public cannot be made part of the debate” and that “[w]e are necessarily committed into the hands of our political leadership”,49 it is incumbent upon just war theorists to ensure that the public are informed and are capable of holding their political leaders to account. To accept the idea that the political leadership are stewards and that accountability will not benefit the public, on whose behalf action is undertaken, but will only benefit al Qaeda,50 is a grotesque act of intellectual irresponsibility. As Walzer has argued, it is precisely because it is “our country” that we are “especially obligated to criticise its policies.”51 This paper has discussed the empirics of the policies of drone strikes in the ongoing conflict with those associate with al Qaeda. It has demonstrated that there are significant moral questions raised by the just war tradition regarding some aspects of these policies and it has argued that, thus far, just war scholars have not paid sufficient attention or engaged in sufficient detail with the policy implications of drone use. As such it has been argued that it is necessary for just war theorists to engage more directly with these issues and to ensure that their work is policy relevant, not in a utilitarian sense of abdicating from speaking the truth in the face of power, but by forcing policy makers to justify their actions according to the principles of the just war tradition, principles which they invoke themselves in formulating policy. By highlighting hypocrisy and providing the tools and language for the interpretation of action, the just war tradition provides the basis for the public engagement and political activism that are necessary for democratic politics.52

# K

#### Experience precludes historical analysis – making oppression visible does not deconstruct its causes

**Scott ‘91** (Joan W., University of Wisconsin, Ph.D; University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, Assistant Professor; Northwestern University, Assistant Professor; University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Associate Professor, Professor; Brown University, Nancy Duke Lewis University Professor, Pembroke Center for Teaching and Research on Women, Founding Director; Institute for Advanced Study, Member, Professor, Harold F. Linder Professor,“The Evidence of Experience,” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Summer, 1991), p. 779-80

To the extent that this system constructs desiring subjects (those who are legitimate as well as those who are not), it simultaneously establishes them and itself as given and outside of time, as the way things work, the way they inevitably are. The project of making experience visible precludes analysis of the workings of this system and of its historicity; instead, it reproduces its terms. We come to appreciate the consequences of the closeting of homosexuals and we understand repression as an interested act of power or domination; alternative behaviors and institutions also become available to us. What we don't have is a way of placing those alternatives within the framework of (historically contingent) dominant patterns of sexuality and the ideology that supports them. We know they exist, but not how they have been constructed; we know their existence offers a critique of normative practices, but not the extent of the critique. Making visible the experience of a different group exposes the existence of repressive mechanisms, but not their inner workings or logics; we know that difference exists, but we don't understand it as relationally constituted. For that we need to attend to the historical processes that, through discourse, position subjects and produce their experiences. It is not individuals who have experience, but subjects who are constituted through experience. Experience in this definition then becomes not the origin of our explanation, not the authoritative (because seen or felt) evidence that grounds what is known, but rather that which we seek to explain, that about which knowledge is produced. To think about experience in this way is to historicize it as well as to historicize the identities it produces. This kind of historicizing represents a reply to the many contemporary historians who have argued that an unproblematized "experience" is the foundation of their practice; it is a historicizing that implies critical scrutiny of all explanatory categories usually taken for granted, including the category of "experience."

#### Single-issue struggles struggles are stuck within coordinates of capitalism—their efforts only serve to regulate the worst excesses of capitalism without challenging its global destruction

Zizek 4 Prof of Sociology at the Institute for Sociology at Ljubljana Univ, 2004, Slavoj, *Conversations With Zizek*, pg 148-9

My position is almost classical Marxist in the sense that I would insist that anti-capitalist struggle is not simply one among other political struggles for greater equality, cultural recognition, anti-sexism and so on.I believe in the central structuring role of the anti-capitalist struggle. And I don’t think that my position is as crazy or idiosyncratic as it appeared maybe a couple a years ago. It is not only the so-called Seattle Movement; there are many other signals that demonstrate—how shall I put it?—capitalism is becoming a problem again; that the honeymoon of globalization, which lasted through the 1990s, is coming to an end. It’s in this context that we can also understand the incredible successes of Negri and Hardt’s Empire, which points out that people are again perceiving capitalism as a problem. It is no longer the old story that the ideological battles are over and that capitalism has won. Capitalism is once more a problem. This would be my starting point. And I am not thinking of anti-capitalist struggle just in terms of consumerist movements. This is not enough. We need to do more than simply organize a multitude of sites of resistance against capitalism**. There is a basic necessity to translate this resistance into a more global project**—otherwise we will merely be creating regulatory instances that control on the worst excesses of capitalism. GD: This also appears to be at the base of your dispute with Ernesto Laclau – in J. Butler (et al.) Contingency, Hegemony, and Universality – where you seem to be arguing that the existing political struggles are already caught up in a certain liberal capitalist ethos and that the contemporary logiics of hegemony are already hegemonized; already configured within the capital processes themselves…SJ**:** Yes, I agree with your formulation that hegemony itself is hegemonized. In what sense? I think that the idea that today we no longer have a central struggle but a multitude of struggles is a fake one, because we shouldn’t forget that the group for this multitude of struggles was created by modern global capitalism. This doesn’t devaluate these struggles: I am not saying they are not real struggles. I am saying that the passage from old-fashioned class struggle to all these post-modern struggles of ecological, cultural, sexual etc. struggles is one that is opened up by global capitalism. **The ground of these struggles is global capitalism**.

#### Their strategy of individual focus is mutually exclusive with our approach that is based on systemic struggle.

Bronner 10 Professor (Professor II) of Political Science at Rutgers, 2010, Stephen Eric, Director of Global Relations: Center for the Study of Genocide and Human Rights at Rutgers University, The Senior Editor of Logos: A Journal of Modern Society and Cultur, his books include, Socialism Unbound, Of Critical Theory and Its Theorists, and Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward A Politics of Radical Engagement. “Capitalism, Identity, and Social Rights” <http://www.logosjournal.com/capitalism-identity-and-social-rights.php> accessed date: 4-8-12 y2k

Max Weber once said that ideology is not like a taxi-cab where the passenger can say to the driver stop at the corner I want to get off. The same is true of identity. Initial groups may be founded on general notions of a trans-class character like race, gender, ethnicity, or sexual preference. But there are a virtually infinite number of identities -- and organizations expressing them – that can arise. The identity and experiences of a straight woman are different from those of a gay woman, those of a gay white woman are different those of a black woman, those of a black woman are different from those of a gay black woman, and those of a gay black woman are different from those of someone else. The point is that identity is not a static concept but rather retains a dynamic character that allows for its increasing specification through multiplication and “hybridity.” But there is a price for this. The existential emphasis upon an ever more precise subjectivity undermines both systemic concepts like capitalism and class as well as universal categories or dealing with the “other.” Competition for a finite set of resources also tended to intensify intolerance and, in order to legitimize claims, generated the desire among identity groups to appear as the “most” victimized. Indeed, speaking politically, by the 1980s the whole of the progressive citizenry had turned into less than the sum of its parts. Identity politics, coalitions of interests, and use of the class ideal can reinforce one another of appear prove mutually exclusive. Which strategy assumes primacy depends upon, using the old jargon, the historical context. Very little then, from the standpoint of immediate practicality, can be stated in general terms or in advance. Articulating these diverse strategies remains important, however, because intellectual clarity about the possibilities of practice is an element of practice itself. Workers may no longer solely be organized in unions, but they are organized in the myriad community identity groups that dot the political landscape. Raising awareness of the way in which class penetrates these groups and beginning the intellectual work of coordinating interests is perhaps the crucial political question facing progressive activists.

**Queer theory reinforces oppression- their incessant need to focus on white gay males as the oppressed group of choice trades off with an ability to recognize other oppressed people groups-**

**Goodloe 94** [Amy, [University of Colorado](http://colorado.academia.edu/) Faculty Member, [Program for Writing and Rhetoric](http://colorado.academia.edu/Departments/Program_for_Writing_and_Rhetoric), “Lesbian-Feminism and Queer Theory:  Another "Battle of the Sexes"?,” http://www.lesbian.org/essays/lesfem-qtheory.html ]ADS

Perhaps the most scathing critique comes from Sheila Jeffreys, whose work is not always received well by non lesbian feminist scholars because of her tendency to claim to speak for all lesbian feminists, when in fact she only speaks for a particularly radical group. In her most recent article, "The Queer Disappearance of Lesbians: Sexuality in the Academy" (1994), **Jeffreys states** simply, "The appearance of queer theory and queer studies threatens to mean the disappearance of lesbians" (459). Jeffreys' concern, like that of so many lesbian feminists, is that queer theory threatens to offset the advances made by feminism by failing altogether to recognize its impact in shaping contemporary understanding of sexuality and gender; **queer theory, she argues, is "feminism free**" (459). Despite its supposedly counter-normative associations, Jeffreys believes the word "queer" has come to signify white gay male, **which renders any project associated with this signifier simply "more of the same,"** while masquerading as "new and uniquely liberating" (469). Thus, unlike Stein, whose critique of queer theory is relatively mild in comparison, Jeffreys accuses this new theoretical discourse of deliberately reinscribing the very oppression(s) that feminists and lesbian feminists have been fighting against for years**, in order to privilege (homo)sexuality and gay male culture as the epitome of the "anti-discourse" made so much of by postmodern theory**. Central to Jeffreys' critique is that queer theory privileges and indeed naturalizes the masculine in a way that runs counter to the aims and goals of most forms of feminism. **The notion of "camp" or "drag," which Jeffreys sees as one of the key concepts of queer theory, is built on gay male notions of performative femininity, which not only excludes biological women but enshrines the dominant construction of masculine as the binary opposite of feminine**; a drag queen's enactment of femininity for the pleasure of other men, rather than calling into question the performative nature of all gender roles, instead fixes perceived sexual difference at the core of desire, a claim early lesbian feminists were most anxious to refute. According to Jeffreys, then, while queer theory may claim to expand the limits of gender by "playing" with the terms that constitute it -- by supposedly separating femininity from the female body in the persona of a drag queen, for example -- it in fact fails to account for the sexism inherent in the terms as they are constituted by the dominant culture. A man "playing at" being a coy, submissive woman, for the benefit of other men, is hardly a vision of sophisticated gender analysis to most lesbian feminists -- which is not to criticize drag queens in and of themselves, so much as to point out the inadequacy of drag as core theoretical concept.

#### Post-modern epistemology results in extinction—engaging with the material reality is necessary for survival.

**Morris**, Emeritus professor of anthropology at Goldsmiths College at the University of London, 19**97**

[Brian, “In Defence of Realism and Truth Critical reflections on the anthropological followers of Heidegger” Critique of Anthropology September 1997 vol. 17 no. 3 313-340, SAGEpub, accesed date: 4-28-12 y2k]

Post-modernist scholars exclaim with some stridency, the ’dissolution’, the ’erasure’ or the ’end’ of truth, reason, history, nature, the self, science and philosophy - misleadingly identifying all these terms with conceptions that are transcendental, ahistoric and absolutist. They thus appear to see nothing between the so-called ’god’s eye’ point of view, a transcendental perspective beyond time and space, and local - supposedly fragmented, undecidable and indeterminable - discourses (Hollinger, 1994: 81). In the process, a sense of common humanity, of human capacities, of human praxis, of human- history is lost. There is no sense of a human life-world - ’an infinitive surrounding world of life’ common to all people, as Husserl expressed it (1970: 139), that is prior and distinct both from cultural world views and transcendentalism. Yet the postmodernists nevertheless recoil from the theoretical implications of their own rather prophetic declarations, and with equal emphasis proclaim that their ’theory’ does not entail either linguistic (cultural) idealism or relativism (Flax, 1995: 155; Hollinger, 1994: 98). They could hardly do otherwise, for outside the groves of academia, and their reified and ’scholastic’ discourses, the natural and social worlds are experienced as a reality, and we experience also a shared humanity that is not reducible to the fragmented discourses of local cultures. What exists, and how the world is constituted, depends, of course on what particular ontology or ’world view’ (to use Dilthey’s term) is being expressed, although in terms of social praxis the reality of the material world is always taken for granted for human survival depends on acknowledging and engaging with this world. As Marx expressed it, we are always engaged in a ’dialogue with the real world’ (1975: 328). It is important then to defend a realist perspective, one Marx long ago described as historical materialism. It is a metaphysics that entails the rejection both of contemplative materialism (the assumption that there is a direct unmediated relationship between consciousness [language] and the world) and constructivism. The latter is just old-fashioned idealism in modern guise, the emphasis being on culture, language and discourses, rather than on individual perception (Berkeley) or a universal cognition (Kant). This approach may also be described as dialectical naturalism (Bookchin, 1990), transcendental or critical realism (Bhaskar, 1978: 25; Collier, 1994), or constructive realism (Ben-Ze’ev, 1995: 50) - recognizing the significant social and cognitive activity of the human agent, but acknowledging the ontological independence and causal powers of the natural world. As Mark Johnson simply puts it: ’How we carve up the world will depend both on what independent of us, and equally on the referential scheme we bring to bear, given our purposes, interests, and goals’ (1987: 202). Our engagement with the world is thus always mediated. Equally important is the fact that we are always, as Marx put it, engaged in a ’dialogue’ with the material world.

#### Local politics fails- we need a systemic analysis to solve

Smith 10 a lecturer in social sciences at the University of Ballarat, 10-29-10, Jeremy, “The rise and malaise of postmodernism” http://links.org.au/node/32 , accessed date: 4-29-12 y2k

The political corollary of postulating all identities as unstable and fragmented is dissipation of opposition to capitalism as a whole: In a fragmented world composed of "decentred subjects", where totalizing knowledges are impossible and undesirable, What better escape, in theory, from a confrontation with capitalism, the most totalizing system the world has ever known, than a rejection of totalizing knowledge What greater obstacle, in practice, to anything more than the most local and particularistic resistances to the global, totalizing power of capitalism than the decentred and fragmented subject What better excuse for submitting to the force majeure of capitalism than the conviction that its power, while pervasive, has no systemic origin, no unified logic, no identifiable social roots24 In this passage, Ellen Meiksins-Wood draws attention to the political implications of postmodernism. If her description of postmodernism holds, then it is possible to go one step further: postmodernism can be characterised as an anti-politics. It is not anti-politics because it does not offer strategy, for it does after a fashion. It is antipolitical because it does not tell us much about what to confront capitalism with. What social, ethical and economic substance can we adopt to develop a vision of another possible world Is such a vision possible without a basis for universalism The most forceful versions of postmodernism can only shrug their collective shoulders ironically, so to speak, when confronted with these questions. We can't really even know the system, much less try to critically articulate credible alternatives to it. To try to change it involves an orientation to state power, and that is fraught with danger. For this reason, the intractable versions of postmodernism avoid politics and offer only an anti-politics dressed up as a localist strategy and not a revolutionary orientation at all. How postmodernists have, in hindsight, treated the movements of 1968 and the possibility of revolution can itself be seen as a test of this anti-politics: What the ideologues supply after the fact is a legitimation of the limits (of the ultimate limitations; in the last analysis of the historic weaknesses) of the May movement: you did not try to seize power and you were right, you did not even try to establish a counter-power. and you were once again right, because to say counter-power. is to say power and so on. At the same time, what the ideologues furnish us with is a retrospective legitimation of withdrawal, renunciation, non-commitment or of a punctilious and measured commitment: in any case, we are told that history, the subject, autonomy are only western myths.25 A "politics" of identity without substance and with strategy that addresses only the local and particular corresponds with this withdrawal after 1968.

#### We’ll win independent DA---Post-modernist epistemology cause societal inaction by denying individual agency and value to life—historical-material epistemology is far superior.

**Skeggs**, Professor at Goldsmiths, University of London, 19**91**

[Beverley, “Postmodernism: What Is All the Fuss about?” British Journal of Sociology of Education, accessed date: 4-29-12 y2k]

This inability to theorise any form of power other than the local, presents particular problem for understanding the role of the state. Most postmodern theorists rely on Foucault's idea that systems of knowledge codify techniques and practices within localised contexts. Whilst Foucault can be exceedingly useful for understanding the role of education in the reproduction of techniques of discipline and surveillance (Foucault, 1977; Ball, 1990) his analysis is less suited to any centralising apparatus. The state simply becomes a multitude of local sites of micro-power: the imposition of the Education Reform Act in England and Wales, and the responses to it, cannot be accounted for in postmodern terms alone. Educational research, or any ethnography, that attempts to understand the words and deeds of others is redundant for postmodernists. The world, according to postmodernists, is opaque; it is all lived on the surface. There is nothing that hides behind its surface appearances. It is not a case of people saying what they mean-rather they don't mean anything-for there is not any meaning to be had; we are all just living simulcra, so it doesn't matter. Even Jameson (1981) conceives of the social totality, not as an entity that can in any sense be experienced directly, but as an absent cause inaccessible to us except in textual form. There is a complete absence of lived experience-other than that of the author-in post- modern accounts. The methodology of play and gamesmanship suggested by Lyotard is an aimless epistemology. The concept of the multiple subject that postmodernists use is derived from a post-structuralist reworking of psychoanalysis. Althusser (1977) conceived of the subject as the site of intersection of a whole overdetermined welter of ideological discourses, noting the spurious nature of unity over the effectively interpellated subject. Foucault articulates the demotion of the subject from constitutive to constituted status. In relation to education, as early as 1981, Walkerdine sug- gested that we occupy a nexus of subjectivities in her examination of the construction of gendered identity. Jameson (1984) argues that the decentred, floating, fragmentary subject becomes the ideal target for advertising conceived as a system which no longer offers a 'magical' sanctuary from 'real' cares and needs, but provides instead an endless succession of vacatable positions for the 'desiring machines' which replace the repressed and alienated workers of the previous epoch. Whilst this may be theoretically useful, Shusterman (1988, TCS) argues that it can also be de-politicising; we cannot generate a general or even personal ethic from our functional role if we inhabit a plurality of inadequately integrated roles both collectively and individually. For instance, Lyotard argues that we inhabit such a motley variety of language-games and are shaped by so many forms of discourse that we can no longer say definitively who we are. Shusterman (1988) suggests that by denying the self's very existence and agency, intellectuals seek to legitimate political and social inaction, unjustifiable and unhappy complacency, even responsibility for their own lives and certainly the lives of others. Rather than referring to the modernist concept of alienated otherness, the postmodern questioning of binary oppositions and exclusions leads to the devel- opment of a play of differences: multiplicitous, heterogeneous and plural. To some theorists this offers liberating effects because, if the centre is seen as a construct and a fiction rather than a fixed and unchangeable reality, the legiti- macy of it comes under scrutiny (Hutcheon, 1989). The concepts of otherness and difference are also useful for understanding racism as Bhabha and Hall show below. However, it can be de-politicising: to equate women with otherness deprives the feminist struggle of any kind of specificity: what is repressed is not otherness but specific, historically constituted agents. Owens (1988, B&R) pro- motes a utopian vision of a concept of difference without opposition; this leads Callinicos (1989) to award him first prize for the silliest argument for being so politically naive. Habermas (1987) accuses postmodernists of being neo-conservatives. As Kellner (1988, TCS) points out, the postmodern world is devoid of meaning; it is a universe of nihilism where theories float in a void, unanchored in any secure harbour or mooring. Meaning requires depth, a hidden dimension, an unseen substratum; in postmodern society, however, everything is explicit, transparent, obscene. This is summed up by Kroker & Cook's (1988) description of politics, written, of course, in the postmodern mode: Politics becomes the flashing anus of promises of the better world constantly present as the carousel becomes the succession of white strobelike flashes and as the waste system runs into the now of party

#### Their politics require rejection of universal knowledge which perpetuates capitalism and anti-politics—historical and material analysis is the only subversive and revolutionary act.

**Smith**, a lecturer in social sciences at the University of Ballarat, 10-29-**10**

[Jeremy, “The rise and malaise of postmodernism” http://links.org.au/node/32 , accessed date: 4-29-12 y2k]

The political corollary of postulating all identities as unstable and fragmented is dissipation of opposition to capitalism as a whole: In a fragmented world composed of "decentred subjects", where totalizing knowledges are impossible and undesirable, What better escape, in theory, from a confrontation with capitalism, the most totalizing system the world has ever known, than a rejection of totalizing knowledge What greater obstacle, in practice, to anything more than the most local and particularistic resistances to the global, totalizing power of capitalism than the decentred and fragmented subject What better excuse for submitting to the force majeure of capitalism than the conviction that its power, while pervasive, has no systemic origin, no unified logic, no identifiable social roots24 In this passage, Ellen Meiksins-Wood draws attention to the political implications of postmodernism. If her description of postmodernism holds, then it is possible to go one step further: postmodernism can be characterised as an anti-politics. It is not anti-politics because it does not offer strategy, for it does after a fashion. It is antipolitical because it does not tell us much about what to confront capitalism with. What social, ethical and economic substance can we adopt to develop a vision of another possible world Is such a vision possible without a basis for universalism The most forceful versions of postmodernism can only shrug their collective shoulders ironically, so to speak, when confronted with these questions. We can't really even know the system, much less try to critically articulate credible alternatives to it. To try to change it involves an orientation to state power, and that is fraught with danger. For this reason, the intractable versions of postmodernism avoid politics and offer only an anti-politics dressed up as a localist strategy and not a revolutionary orientation at all. How postmodernists have, in hindsight, treated the movements of 1968 and the possibility of revolution can itself be seen as a test of this anti-politics: What the ideologues supply after the fact is a legitimation of the limits (of the ultimate limitations; in the last analysis of the historic weaknesses) of the May movement: you did not try to seize power and you were right, you did not even try to establish a counter-power. and you were once again right, because to say counter-power. is to say power and so on. At the same time, what the ideologues furnish us with is a retrospective legitimation of withdrawal, renunciation, non-commitment or of a punctilious and measured commitment: in any case, we are told that history, the subject, autonomy are only western myths.25 A "politics" of identity without substance and with strategy that addresses only the local and particular corresponds with this withdrawal after 1968.

#### Historical Method comes first – this debate is not about what the aff does but rather was the aff formulated with accurate knowledge on history – we must ground our debates in accurate historical methods that only Marxism can account for

Tumino 1 Stephen, Prof. English @ Pitt, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

Happens because of cap---loss of productive.

#### Fear of death is inevitable

Pyszczynski et al 6¶ Tom, Prof. Psych. – U. Colorado, Sheldon Solomon, Prof. Psych. – Skidmore College, Jeff Greenberg, Prof. Psych. – U. Arizona, and Molly Maxfield, U. Colorado, Psychological Inquiry, “On the Unique Psychological Import of the Human Awareness of Mortality: Theme and Variations” 17:4, Ebsco

Kirkpatrick and Navarette’s (this issue) first specific complaint with TMT is that it is wedded to an outmoded assumption that human beings share with many other species a survival instinct. They argue that natural selection can only build instincts that respond to specific adaptive challenges in specific situations, and thus could not have designed an instinct for survival because staying alive is a broad and distal goal with no single clearly defined adaptive response. Our use of the term survival instinct was meant to highlight the general orientation toward continued life that is expressed in many of an organism’s bodily systems (e.g., heart, liver, lungs, etc) and the diversea pproach and avoidance tendencies that promote its survival and reproduction, ultimately leading to genes being passed on to fu- ture generations. Our use of this term also reflects the classic psychoanalytic, biological, and anthropological influences on TMT of theorists like Becker (1971, 1973, 1975), Freud (1976, 1991), Rank (1945, 1961, 1989), Zilborg (1943), Spengler (1999), and Darwin (1993). We concur that natural selection, at least initially, is unlikely to design a unitary survival instinct, but rather, a series of specific adaptations that have tended over evolutionary time to promote the survival of an organism’s genes. However, whether one construes these adaptations as a series of discrete mechanisms or a general overarching tendency that encompasses many specific systems, we think it hard to argue with the claim that natural selection usually orients organisms to approach things that facilitate continued existence and to avoid things that would likely cut life short. This is not to say that natural selection doesn’t also select for characteristics that facilitate gene survival in other ways, or that all species or even all humans, will always choose life over other valued goals in all circumstances. Our claim is simply that a general orientation toward continued life exists because staying alive is essential for reproduction in most species, as well as for child rearing and support in mammalian species and many others. Viewing an animal as a loose collection of independent modules that produce responses to specific adaptively-relevant stimuli may be useful for some purposes, but it overlooks the point that adaptation involves a variety of inter-related mechanisms working together to insure that genes responsible for these mechanisms are more numerously represented in future generations (see, e.g., Tattersall, 1998). For example, although the left ventricle of the human heart likely evolved to solve a specific adaptive problem, this mechanism would be useless unless well-integrated with other aspects of the circulatory system. We believe it useful to think in terms of the overarching function of the heart and pulmonary-circulatory system, even if specific parts of that system evolved to solve specific adaptive problems within that system. In addition to specific solutions to specific adaptive problems, over time, natural selection favors integrated systemic functioning(Dawkins, 1976; Mithen, 1997). It is the improved survival rates and reproductive success of lifeformspossessing integrated systemic characteristics that determine whether those characteristics become widespread in a population. Thus, we think it is appropriate and useful to characterize a glucose-approaching amoeba and a bear-avoiding salmon as oriented toward self-preservation and reproduction, even if neither species possesses one single genetically encoded mechanism designed to generally foster life or insure reproduction, or cognitive representations of survival and reproduction. This is the same position that Dawkins (1976) took in his classic book, The selfish gene: The obvious first priorities of a survival machine, and of the brain that takes the decisions for it, are individual survival and reproduction. … Animals therefore go to elaborate lengths to find and catch food; to avoid being caught and eaten themselves; to avoid disease and accident; to protect themselves from unfavourable climatic conditions; to find members of the opposite sex and persuade them to mate; and to confer on their children advantages similar to those they enjoy themselves. (pp. 62–63) All that is really essential to TMT is the proposition that humans fear death. Somewhat ironically, in the early days of the theory,we felt compelled to explain this fear by positing a very basic desire for life, because many critics adamantly insisted, for reasons that were never clear to us, that most people do not fear death. Our explanation for the fear of death is that knowledge of the inevitability of death is frightening because people know they are alive and because they want to continue living. Do Navarrete and Fessler (2005) really believe that humans do not fear death? Although people sometimes claim that they are not afraid of death, and on rare occasions volunteer for suicide missions and approach their death, this requires extensive psychological work, typically a great deal of anxiety, and preparation and immersion in a belief system that makes this possible (see TMT for an explanation of how belief systems do this). Where this desire for life comes from is an interesting question, but not essential to the logic of the theory. Even if Kirkpatrick and Navarrete (this issue) were correct in their claims that a unitary self-preservation instinct was not, in and of itself, selected for, it is indisputable that many discrete and integrated mechanisms that keep organisms alive were selected for. A desire to stay alive, and a fear of anything that threatens to end one’s life, are likely emergent properties of these many discrete mechanisms that result from the evolution of sophisticated cognitive abilities for symbolic, future- oriented, and self-reflective thought. As Batson and Stocks (2004) have noted, it is because we are so intelligent, and hence so aware of our limbic reactions to threats of death and of our many systems oriented toward keeping us alive that we have a general fear of death. Here are three quotes that illustrate this point. First, for psychologists, Zilboorg (1943), an important early source of TMT: “Such constant expenditure of psychological energy on the business of preserving life would be impossible if the fear of death were not as constant” (p. 467). For literature buffs, acclaimed novelist Faulkner (1990) put it this way: If aught can be more painful to any intelligence above that of a child or an idiot than a slow and gradual confronting with that which over a long period of bewil- derment and dread it has been taught to regard as an irrevocable and unplumbable finality, I do not know it. (pp. 141–142) And perhaps most directly, for daytime TV fans, from The Young and the Restless (2006), after a rocky plane flight: Phyllis: I learned something up in that plane Nick: What? Phyllis: I really don’t want to die. An important consequence of the emergence of this general fear of death is that humans are susceptible to anxiety due to events or stimuli that are not immediately present and novel threats to survival that did not exist for our ancestors, such as AIDS, guns, or nuclear weapons. Regardless of how this fear originates, it is abundantly clear that humans do fear death. Anyone who has ever faced a man with a gun, a doctor saying that the lump on one’s neck is suspicious and requires further diagnostic tests, or a drunken driver swerving into one’s lane can attest to that. If humans only feared evolved specific